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Article 2

RELIGIOUS LIBERTY JUDICIALLY DEFINED
The writing of this paper is undertaken with the object
of considering the judicial decisions of the federal and
state jurisdictions wherein the right of religious liberty has
been considered, and therefrom to attempt to formulate a
definition of the extension of this most cherished right in the
United States. At the outset, I wish to state that there are
abroad a multitude of erroneous notions relating to what religious liberty is and what it is not. Some of these misconceptions of the purview of this right are in part due to a misunderstanding of the extension of the religious liberty clauses
of the Constitution of the United States. These notions of
constitutional protection of this right range from absurd
liberality to ridiculous limitation. It is believed that, by selecting excerpts from the decisions of the leading state courts
and the Supreme Court of the United States a somewhat encompassing statement of the meaning of the constitutional
guarantee of religious freedom can be adduced.
Moreover, it seems fitting to preface this discussion with
a reference to the reasons why the religious liberty clause
was incorporated into the Federal Constitution. In 1787,
when the Federal Constitution emerged from the multitude
of varied and conflicting ideas prevalent in Convention Hall,
Philadelphia, it contained a prohibition against the establishment of any religious test as a requisite for holding.office.
Article 6, Section 3, provides that "No religious test shall
ever be required as a qualification for office." The people of
that day, some of whom had experienced the barbarity of
religious proscription, and many others had witnessed the enactment of that most fanatical of all misguided persecutions
were not content with the above brief guarantee. The theory
of the constitution was a further protection against the interference with religion by Congress, but even with these protecting guarantees there were men who continued to enter-
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tain a fear that this precious right might be circumscribed.
Agitation for a more emphatic and specific declaration that
no molestation with religious belief or the free and unhampered practice thereof should ever be tolerated, finally culminated in the incorporation of the First Amendment into
the Federal Constitution. This Amendment, the first of the
Bill of Rights, is but the concrete expression of the further
demand on the part of the people that Congress should never
be permitted to proscribe the religion of any man. It is highly significant that the monumental Bill of Rights in the Federal Constitution is introduced by this most cherished
Amendment respecting freedom of religion. It provides that
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. . . ." This
amendment clearly denies Congress the authority to enact
any legislation proscribing a man's religious affiliations.
However, contrary to a notion which has gained considerable prevalence, the Federal Constitution contains no denial to the several states of the power to legislate respecting
freedom of religion. The Federal Constitution being the
measure of the powers that the states surrendered to the
Federal Government, hence, since there is no delegation of
the power to regulate religion to Congress and no denial of it
to the states, it follows that they (the states) intended to retain the power to regulate the belief and number of religions.
"The Constitution makes no provision for protecting the
citizens of the respective states in their religious liberties;
this is left to the state constitutions and laws. Nor is there
-any inhibition imposed by the Constitution of the United
States in this respect on the states." ' The probable extent of
the intendment of the First Amendment was to leave the
citizens of the several states free from any interference with
religion by Congress, as the people did not fear their state
governments, but many had an ever present fear of the new
I

Permoli v. Municipality No. 1 of New Orleans, 3 How. 589, 609 (1845).
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Federal Government. The Supreme Court of the United
States, in speaking of this Amendment, said that it was intended to allow everyone under the jurisdiction of the United
States to entertain such notions respecting his relations to
his Maker and the duties they impose, as may be approved
by his judgment and conscience and to exhibit his sentiments
in such form of worship as he may think proper and not injurious to the equal rights of others, and to prohibit legislation for the support of any religious tenets or the modes of
worship of any sect.2
The states, therefore, in so far as the Federal Constitution is concerned, are free to enact laws concerning citizens
in their religious liberties - a privilege which Congress is
denied by positive inhibition and fundamental principle.
Hence, a state may establish one religion and prohibit the
free exercise of all others.3 All of the forty-eight state constitutions, in unmistakable terms, provide for freedom of
religion but vary considerably in the methods of expression.
The Michigan Constitution, for example, states that "Every
person shall be at liberty to worship God according to the
dictates of his own conscience. No person shall be compelled
to attend, or, against his consent, to contribute to the erection or support of any place of religious worship, or to pay
tithes, taxes or other rates for the support of any minister
of the gospel or teacher of religion." ' Twenty state constitutions are careful to provide that liberty of conscience shall
not be construed to dispense with oaths or affirmations.
.Others provide that liberty of conscience shall not be construed so as to excuse acts of licentiousness, nor justify
practices inconsistent with the state. Idaho, Montana, Utah,
Oklahoma, Arizona and New Mexico expressly except polyg5
amous marriages from the guaranty of religious freedom.
2 Davis v. Beason, 133 U. S. 333, 342 (1889).
3 People v. Board of Education of Dist. 24, 245 Ill. 334, 92 N. E. 251 (1910).
4 MicH. CONST. (1908) art. 2, § 3.
5
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RELIGIOUS LIBERTY JUDICIALLY DEFINED

It has been noted in the foregoing pages that the restraints
imposed upon the state legislatures vary in detail and extend
to a variety of situations. From the forty-eight state constitutions we are able to deduce certain things which the states
cannot do in regard to freedom of religion. These deductions
have been ably summarized by Judge Cooley 6 as prohibiting: (1) Any law respecting an establishment of religion;
(2) Compulsory support of religious instructions; (3) Compulsory attendance upon religious worship; (4) Restraints
upon the free exercise of religion; and (5) Restraints upon
the expression of religious belief. In a subsequent paragraph
I shall amplify the foregoing restraints. Thus we see that
the American citizen, if considered in his dual capacity as a
citizen of the United States and of a state, is protected on
the one hand against Congressional interference by the Federal Constitution and on the other by the constitution of his
state.
The legislatures have not been left at liberty to effect a
union of church and state, or to establish preferences by law
in favor of any mode of worship or religious persuasion.
There is not complete religious liberty where any one sect
is favored by the state and given an advantage by law over
other sects. Whatever establishes a distinction against one
class or sect is, to the extent to which the distinction operates
unfavorably, a persecution. The extent of the discrimination
is not material to the principle; it is enough that it creates
an inequality of right or privilege.7 Compulsory support, by
taxation or otherwise, of religious instruction is unlawful.
Not only is no one denomination to be favored at the expense of the rest, but all support of religious instruction must
be entirely voluntary. It is not within the sphere of government to coerce it. (We must except New Hampshire from
the above prohibition since the constitution of that State
permits the legislature to empower "the several towns, par6

7

COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LmITATIONS (6th ed.) 575.
State v. Neitzel, 69 Wash. 567, 125 Pac. 939 (1912).
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ishes, bodies corporate, or religious societies within the state
to make adequate provisions, at their own expense, for the
support and maintenance of public Protestant teachers of
piety, religion and morality.") 8 The last three constitutional
conventions have recommended the abolition of this Puritanic article but to no avail.' In some jurisdictions it has
been held that under a constitutional provision prohibiting
the expenditure of public money in aid of any sectarian institution, the state and its political subdivisions are inhibited
from entering into any contract with sach an institution to
pay it for services to be rendered or expenses incurred in
pursuance of the contract.' 0 However, in other states the
courts have held that where no more than the actual cost
of the services are paid there is no aid rendered within the
meaning of the Constitution. Compulsory attendance upon
religious worship is not permissible. Those who are led by
choice or a sense of duty to attend upon the ordinances of
religion are not to be compelled to do so by the state. It is the
province of the state to enforce, so far as it may be found
practicable, the obligations and duties which the citizen may
be under or may owe his fellow-men or to society; but those
which spring from the relations between himself and his
Maker are to be enforced by the admonitions of the conscience, and not by the penalties of human laws. Indeed, as
all real worship must essentially and necessarily consist in
the free-will offering of adoration and gratitude by the creature to the Creator, human laws are obviously inadequate
to invite or compel those internal and voluntary emotions
which shall induce it, and human penalties at most could
only enforce the observance of idle ceremonies, which when
unwillingly performed, are alike valueless to the participants
and devoid of all elements of true worship." Restraints upN. H. CoNsT. art. 6, part. 1.
9 DEAY, AmUmcA STATE CoNsTnauTioNs 136.
10 Dunn v. Chicago Industrial School for Girls, 280 I1. 613, 117 N. E. 735
(1917); Bennett v. City of La Grange, 153 Ga. 428, 112 S. E. 482 (1922).
11 CooLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LInITATIONS 968.
8
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on the free exercise of religion according to the dictates of
conscience are inhibited. No external authority is to place
itself between the finite being and the Infinite when the
former is seeking to render homage that is due, and in a mode
which commends itself to his conscience and judgment as being suitable for him to render, and acceptable to its object.
However, as we have seen, religious liberty does not include
the right to introduce and carry out every scheme or purpose which persons see fit to claim as a part of their religious
system. No one can stretch his liberty so as to interfere with
that of his neighbors, or violate public regulations or the
penal laws of the land, enacted for the good order and general welfare of all the people. 2 Acts done in the performance
of religious worship, if inimical to the good order and general
welfare of the community or in conflict with the general
penal laws, are not within the purview of the protection afforded by the state or federal constitutions. 3
The constitutional guarantees of religious freedom do not
prohibit the establishment of reasonable rules for the use of
streets and forbidding playing an instrument therein though
such playing be an act of worship. Again, a statute in Ohio
making it a misdemeanor to give Christian Science treatment
for a fee was held to be a constitutional interference with
freedom of religion.1 4
And lastly, restraints upon the expression of religious belief. "An earnest believer usually regards as his duty to propagate his opinions, and to bring others to his views. To deprive him of this right is to take from him the power to perform what he considers a most sacred obligation." "I
The Supreme Court of the United States in Reynolds v.
United States,'6 in considering the claim of the Mormons
12 Commonwealth v. Plaisted, 148 Mass. 374, 19 N. E. 224 (1889); State v.
White, 64 N. H. 48, 5 AtI. 828 (1886).
13 State v. White, op. cit. supra nQte 12; Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S.
145 (1878).
14 State v. Marble, 72 Ohio St. 21, 73 N. E. 1063 (1905).
15 CooLY, CoNsruTIoNAL LIMITATIONS 966, 967.
16 Op. cit. supra note 13.
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that the religious freedom guarantee of the Federal Constitution protected them in the practice of polygamy, insisting that such a practice was a tenet of their religion and
therefore within the purview of the constitutional protection,
resorted to the opinion of Thomas Jefferson, in attempting
to reach a definition of the scope of the constitutional guarantees placed upon religious liberty by the Federal Constitution. Congress had passed a law prohibiting polygamy in
the territory of the United States; but the Mormons of Utah
contended that since polygamy was a tenet of their religion
Congress could not forbid it. Chief Justice Waite, in speaking for the court, quoted excerpts from Jefferson's works
wherein he defined the meaning and scope of freedom of religion in the United States. The bill providing for religious
freedom in Virginia, which was written by Jefferson, contains in its preamble a definition of freedom of religion:
"That to suffer the civil magistrate to intrude his powers into
the field of religion and to restrain the profession or propagation of principles on supposition of their ill tendency, is a
dangerous fallacy which at once destroys all religious liberty"; and, furthermore, therein it is declared "that it is time
enough for the rightful purposes of civil government for its
officers to interfere when principles break out in overt acts
against peace and good order." (Italics are mine.) In the
above lines from Jefferson's pen the true distinction between
what properly comes within the respective domains of the
church and the state is defined. Jefferson admits that when
overt acts inevitably result pursuant to the adoption and
execution of certain tenets incorporated into the body of
doctrines of a sect then the agents of the state are at liberty
to intrude and to regulate or forbid the perpetration of such
acts.
Again, Jefferson said, in answer to an address to him by
a committee of the Danbury Baptist Association: "Believing
with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between
man and his God; that he owes account to none other for
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his faith or his worship; that legislative powers of the Government reach actions only, and not opinions, I contemplate
with sovereign reverence that act of the whole American
people which declared that their Legislature should make
no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, thus building a wall of
separation between church and state. Adhering to this expression of the supreme will of the nation in behalf of the
rights of conscience, I shall see, with sincere satisfaction, the
progress of these sentiments which tend to restore man to
all his natural rights, convinced he has no natural rights in
opposition to his social duties." "7(Italics are mine.)
The Chief Justice remarked that these statements, coming from the foremost and acknowledged leader of the advocates of freedom of religion, have come to be accepted as
authoritative, and as establishing the legal scope of the definition of the clauses of the Federal Constitution which relates to freedom of religion. In concluding the decision
wherein the right of congress to forbid polygamy was upheld, the Chief Justice said: "Congress was deprived of all
legislative power over mere opinion, but was left free to
reach actions which were in violation of social duties and
subversive of good order."
While religious freedom is securely ensconced in our
American political dualism it does not follow that everything
which anyone may desire to include in his religion will be
afforded protection by the states or the United States.
Should so liberal a construction be put upon the religious
freedom protecting statements of the federal and state constitutions as to permit a sect to incorporate every tenet into
its statement of doctrine that perverted reason might dictate, the very purpose of the constitutional protection of religious freedom could be circumvented. Furthermore, a situation is not difficult to concoct where the state would not be
17 8 Jeff. Works 113, quoted in Reynolds v. United States, op. cit. supra
note 13.
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able to achieve its goal. The Ohio Supreme Court, in construing the scope of freedom of religion, said: "Religious
liberty does not consist in the right of any sect to oppose its
views to the policy of the government. Such a claim would
end in simple intolerance of all not in accord with the sentiments of the particular sect." "8The Supreme Court of Michigan, in interpreting the same proposition, remarked that religious freedom does not include "the right to introduce and
carry out every scheme or purpose which persons see fit to
claim as part of their religious system." 1"The Alabama
court, in condemning the claim to unqualified freedom of religion, used the following pertinent words: "It would be subversive of good government to subordinate the power of restraining acts prejudicial to the public welfare, and productive of social injury, to the convictions of each individual as
to acts which religious sentiment may demand." 20
The Supreme Court of the United States declared that
Christianity is a part of the common law in that its divine
origin and truth are admitted, and therefore it is not to be
maliciously and openly reviled and blasphemed against to
the annoyance of believers or the injury to the public. 2 In
Massachusetts convictions under a statute punishing blasphemers have been upheld. The court proceeded on the principle that the purpose of the statute was not to prevent or
restrain the formation of any opinions or the profession of
any religious sentiments whatever but to restrain and punish
acts which have a tendency to disturb the public peace.2 2
Thus the state in the furtherance of its duty to preserve the
public peace may forbid those acts which will inevitably
antagonize the religious sensibilities of the people to such
an extent as to cause riotous outbursts.

20

State v. Powell, 58 Ohio 324, 341, 50 N. E. 900, 901 (1898).
Mayor of Frazee's Case, 63 Mich. 396, 405, 30 N. W. 72 (1886).
Frolickstein v. Mayor of Mobile, 40 Ala. 725 (1867).
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Vidal v. Girard's Executors, 2 How. 127, 198 (1844).
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Commonwealth v. Kneeland, 37 Mass. 206, 221 (1838).
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In reverting to the constitutional limitations placed upon
Congress, by the constitution of the United States it is well
to quote from the works of Justice Story, perhaps the foremost classical expounder of the constitution. Congress is forbidden, by the First Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States, from making any law respecting an establishment of. religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.
Justice Story says of this provision: "It was under a solemn
consciousness of the dangers from ecclesiastical ambition,
the bigotry of spiritual pride, and the intolerance of sects,
thus exemplified in our domestic, as well as in foreign annals, that it was deemed advisable to exclude from the national government all power to act upon the subject. The situation, too, of the different states equally proclaimed the
policy, as well as the necessity, of such an exclusion. In some
of the states, Episcopalians constituted the predominant
sect; in others, Presbyterians; in others, Congregationalists;
in others, Quakers; and in others again, there was a close numerical rivalry among contending sects. It was impossible
that there should not arise perpetual strife and jealousy on the
subject of ecclesiastical ascendancy, if the national government were left free to create a religious establishment. The
only security was in extirpating the power. But this alone
would have been an imperfect security, if it had not been
followed up by a declaration of the right of the free exercise
of religion, and a prohibition (as we have seen) of all religious tests. Thus, the whole power over the subject is left
exclusively to the state governments, to be acted upon according to their own sense of justice, and the state constitutions; and the Catholic and Protestant, the Calvinist and
the Arminian, the Jew and the infidel, may sit down at the
common table of the national councils, without any inquisition into their faith or mode of worship." 23
The American citizen is protected in his religious liberty
against any act of the Federal government by the Constitu23

STORY'S COMMMNTARIES ON TIM CONSTITUTION (ABRIDGMENT)

§ 992.
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tion of the United States and against any act of his state
government by his state constitution. Under both he is entirely free to formulate any opinion whatsoever in regard to
religion, to practice and teach it to others, provided he respects their rights and does not incite to crime or a breach of
peace. In defining forbidden acts the law recognizes the
Christian religion as the prevailing religion in this country
and punishes blasphemers, Mormons, Christian Scientists,
fortune-tellers, members of the Salvation Army and others,
though the acts which brought them into conflict with the
law have been performed with a religious motive. It fosters
religion by affording churches the right to become corporations, by protecting their worship against disturbance, by
exempting their property from taxation and by providing for
the cessation from work on Sunday. It permits the Bible, or
portions of it, to be read in the public schools, Illinois excepted. The constitution of Illinois provides: "The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship,
without discrimination, shall forever be guaranteed; and no
person shall be denied any civil or political right, privilege or
capacity, on account of his religious opinions; but the liberty of conscience hereby secured shall not be construed to
dispense with oaths or affirmations, excuse acts of licentiousness, or justify practices inconsistent with the peace or safety
of the State. No person shall be required to attend or support any ministry or place of worship against his consent,
nor shall any preference be given by law to any religious denomination or mode of worship." 2 4 In People v. Board of
Education of Dist. 2425 the Illinois court held that the reading
of the Bible in the public schools, plus the singing of religious
hymns and bowing of heads, etc., constituted acts of worship
and such worship as is peculiar to the Protestant Church, and
hence sectarian and contrary to the State Constitution. Two
24 ILL. CONST. (1870) art. 2, § 3.
25 245 Ill. 334, 92 N. E. 251 (1910). Accord: O'Connor v. Hendrick, 184 N.
Y. 421, 77 N. E. 612 (1906).
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judges dissented, writing an extensive opinion. This decision
is quite in keeping with the proper application of the principle of separation of church and state. It permits the use of
public-school building for Sunday schools and other forms of
religious worship where such use does not conflict with the
school laws or regulations and permits churches to lease their
buildings to school districts for a consideration. It frowns
upon the wearing of denominational garments in the public
schools by teachers and does not suffer pupils to break up the
school discipline by absenting themselves from the public
schools on days that are only religious holidays.2"
Francis Aloysius McCullough.
Dallas, Texas.
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